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Abstract
Artemov established an arithmetical interpretation for the Logics of Proofs LPCS,
which yields a classical provability semantics for the modal logic S4. These Logics
of Proofs are parameterized by so-called constant specications CS that state which
axioms can be used in the reasoning process, and the arithmetical interpretation relies
on the constant specications being nite. In this paper, we remove this restriction by
introducing weak arithmetical interpretations that are sound and complete for a wide
class of constant specications, including innite ones. In particular, they interpret
the full Logic of Proofs LP.
Keywords: Logic of Proofs, arithmetical interpretation, BHK semantics
1 Introduction
The original motivation for developing the rst justication logic, the Logic
of Proofs, was to provide intuitionistic logic with an adequate provability se-
mantics. That is a semantics that respects Brouwer's fundamental idea, see,
e.g., [21], that
intuitionistic truth means provability. (1)
Heyting and Kolmogorov [13,14,15] gave an explicit (but informal) denition
of this notion of intuitionistic truth, which nowadays is known as Brouwer{
Heyting{Kolmogorov (BHK) semantics for intuitionistic logic.
BHK semantics is widely accepted as the intended semantics for intuitionis-
tic logic. However, it is purely informal and does not provide a precise denition
of intuitionistic truth. This was tackled by G odel [9] who introduced a modal
calculus of classical provability (essentially equivalent to S4) with the intended
reading of 2F as F is provable. G odel dened a translation t() from IL to S4
where the translation t(F) of an intuitionistic formula F is given by
prex each subformula of F with a 2-modality.2 Weak Arithmetical Interpretationsfor the Logic of Proofs
He apparently considered this to be an appropriate formalization of Brouwer's
thesis (1). G odel established that
IL ` F implies S4 ` t(F) .
He conjectured that the converse direction also holds, which was later shown
by McKinsey and Tarski [17].
However, the ultimate goal of providing a classical provability semantics
for IL is not achieved by G odel's translation because no precise semantics is
given for the provability operator 2. The situation can be depicted as follows:
IL ,! S4 ,! :::???::: ,! classical proofs .
Artemov [1,2] was able to give a formal provability semantics for S4. He
introduced the Logic of Proofs LPCS, which is a system in the spirit of S4 but
with explicit proof terms.
Artemov established a realization theorem, which provides an embed-
ding r() of S4 into LPCS. Further he developed a formal provability semantics
for LPCS, which gives us the following chain of exact embeddings:
IL ,! S4 ,! LPCS ,! classical proofs .
Hence the Logic of Proofs LPCS can be viewed as a formalization of the BHK se-
mantics for intuitionistic propositional logic.
It is important to note that LPCS is not one single logic but rather a family
of logics that is parameterized by a so-called constant specication CS. The
purpose of this constant specication, roughly, is to state which axioms are
available for the reasoning process. Artemov's arithmetical semantics only
works for nite CS, which in a sense is enough since each proof can only refer
to nitely many axioms. However, dierent proofs may refer to dierent sets
of axioms. So what we actually have is the following statement (where L2 is
the language of modal logic):
Theorem 1.1 There exists a realization r such that for each L2-formula F
S4 ` F if and only if r(F) is arithmetically CS-valid
for some nite constant specication CS.
In other words, the constant specication and, hence, the notion of validity
depend on the formula F. It is the aim of this paper to reverse the order
of these two quantiers: the existential quantier over CS and the universal
quantier over arithmetical interpretations hidden inside validity. We establish
an arithmetical interpretation result where CS does not depend on the formula.
Namely, we show the following:
Theorem 1.2 Let CS be a primitive recursive, axiomatically appropriate, and
schematic constant specication. There exists a realization r such that for each
L2-formula F
S4 ` F if and only if r(F) is weakly arithmetically CS-valid.Kuznets and Studer 3
Of course, there is a price to pay for the independence of the constant
specication. Artemov's arithmetical semantics interprets the operations on
evidence terms by computable functions on codes for proofs. It seems that this
is only possible for nite constant specications. Hence, we cannot impose this
restriction and, consequently, call our semantics weak.
2 The Logic of Proofs
Justication terms are built from countably many (justication) constants ci
and countably many (justication) variables xi according to the following gram-
mar:
t ::= ci j xi j (t  t) j (t + t) j !t :
We denote the set of terms by Tm. Formulas are built from countably many
atomic propositions pi according to the following grammar:
F ::= pi j ? j (F ! F) j t:F :
Prop denotes the set of atomic propositions and LJ denotes the set of formulas.
We dene negation :, conjunction ^, and disjunction _ as usual.
The axioms of LP consist of all instances of the following schemes:
(i) all propositional tautologies
(ii) t:(A ! B) ! (s:A ! t  s:B) Application
(iii) s:A _ t:A ! s + t:A Sum
(iv) t:A ! A Reection
(v) t:A ! !t:t:A Positive Introspection
A constant specication CS for LP is any subset
CS  f(c;A) j c is a constant and A is an axiom of LPg:
For a constant specication CS the deductive system LPCS is the Hilbert sys-
tem given by the axioms above and by the rules modus ponens and axiom
necessitation:
A A ! B
B
(MP) ;
(c;A) 2 CS
c:A
(AN) :
Denition 2.1 A constant specication CS is called
(i) axiomatically appropriate if for each axiom A of LP, there is a constant c
such that (c;A) 2 CS;
(ii) schematic if it satises the following property: for each constant c, the
set of axioms fA j (c;A) 2 CSg consists of all instances of one or several
(possibly zero) axiom schemes of LP;
(iii) almost schematic if it is the union of a schematic and a nite constant
speci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3 Decidability for LPCS
Generated models are models for LPCS where the evidence relation is generated
by a least xed point construction. To inductively build-up this least xed
point, we need a monotone operator, which is given as follows.
Denition 3.1 [Evidence closure] Let B  Tm  LJ. For a set X  Tm  LJ
we dene clB(X)  Tm  LJ by:
(i) if (t;A) 2 B, then (t;A) 2 clB(X);
(ii) if (s;A) 2 X or (t;A) 2 X, then (s + t;A) 2 clB(X);
(iii) if (s;A) 2 X and (t;A ! B) 2 X, then (t  s;B) 2 clB(X);
(iv) if (t;A) 2 X, then (!t;t:A) 2 clB(X).
Note that clB is a monotone operator on Tm  LJ. Hence, it has a least xed
point. We dene the minimal evidence relation E(B) over B to be the least
xed point of clB.
Denition 3.2 [Generated Model] A generated model is a pair M = (val;B)
where val  Prop and B  Tm  LJ. For a constant specication CS, the
generated model M is called a generated CS-model if CS  B.
Denition 3.3 Let M = (val;B) be a generated model and D be a formula.
We dene the relation M  D by
(i) M 6 ?
(ii) M  pi iff pi 2 val
(iii) M  A ! B iff M 1 A or M  B
(iv) M  t:A iff (t;A) 2 E(B) and M  A.
Denition 3.4 [Finitary model] Let CS be an almost schematic constant spec-
ication. Let C  Tm  LJ be nite and set B = CS [ C. Further let val be
a nite valuation, that is a nite subset of Prop. Then we call the generated
CS-model M = (val;B) a nitary CS-model.
A formula D is valid with respect to nitary CS-models if M  D for all
nitary CS-models M.
We have soundness and completeness of LPCS with respect to nitary CS-
models (see [16,6]).
Theorem 3.5 Let CS be an almost schematic constant specication. For each
formula F 2 LJ
LPCS ` F iff F is valid with respect to nitary CS-models.
Remark 3.6 CS is restricted to be almost schematic only because this re-
striction is present in the denition of nitary models. It is possible to prove
soundness and completeness for any CS for an extended class of models.
Finitary models are the key to establishing decidability for Logics of Proofs.
In particular, we have the following result.Kuznets and Studer 5
Theorem 3.7 Let CS be a primitive recursive and almost schematic constant
specication. The satisfaction relation for nitary CS-models is primitive re-
cursive.
Proof. By a careful examination of the decision algorithm for the satisfaction
relation from [16, Corollary 4.4.8]. 2
4 Peano Arithmetic
In this section, we introduce all notions and concepts of Peano Arithmetic PA
that will be needed later in order to present arithmetical interpretations for the
Logic of Proofs. We employ a formulation of PA that includes symbols for all
primitive recursive functions and relations.
The language LPA of arithmetic is the language of rst-order logic with
countably many (individual) variables, the logical symbols ?;!;8, and the
following non-logical symbols:
(i) an n-ary function symbol f for each n-ary primitive recursive function f;
(ii) an n-ary relation symbol R for each n-ary primitive recursive relation R.
We use x;y;z;::: to denote individual variables of LPA and hope the reader
is able to distinguish them from the justication variables of LJ. Further,
we denote formulas of LPA by ; ;:::. A sentence is a formula without free
occurrences of variables.
For each natural number n, we use its standard representation
s(s(:::s
| {z }
n
(0):::)) in the language LPA, call it a numeral, and denote it by n.
When working in LPA, we will often use f for f, R for R, and n for n whenever
the exact typication can be inferred from the context. In particular, we often
write = for =.
Peano Arithmetic PA is given in the language LPA. It comprises the axioms
and rules of rst-order predicate logic, equality axioms for the primitive recur-
sive relation =, and dening axioms for all primitive recursive functions and
relations. As usual, we write PA `  if the formula  is provable in PA.
If  is a sentence, we write N   to say that  is true in the standard
model N of the natural numbers. In the following, we assume that PA is sound
with respect to N: for all LPA-sentences ,
PA `  implies N   . (2)
Denition 4.1 LPA-formulas  and   are called provably equivalent if
PA `  $   .
Now we can dene several important classes of LPA-formulas.
Denition 4.2
(i) A standard primitive recursive formula is an LPA-formula of the form
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where R is an n-ary primitive recursive relation.
(ii) A standard 1-formula is an LPA-formula of the form
9x
where  is a standard primitive recursive formula.
(iii) An LPA-formula  is provably 1 if there exists a standard 1-formula  
such that  and   are provably equivalent.
(iv) An LPA-formula  is provably 1 if both  and : are provably 1.
Provably 1 formulas have a nice closure property.
Lemma 4.3 The class of provably 1 formulas is closed under Boolean con-
nectives and under substitutions of terms for variables. All standard primitive
recursive formulas are provably 1.
It is a very important fact that PA is complete for provably 1 sentences.
Lemma 4.4
(i) Let  be a provably 1 sentence. If N  , then PA ` .
(ii) Let  be a sentence such that : is provably 1. If N 2 , then PA ` :.
Formulating this lemma for provably 1 sentences yields the following the-
orem, which we are going to apply often.
Theorem 4.5 Let  be a provably 1 sentence.
(i) If N  , then PA ` .
(ii) If N 2 , then PA ` :.
To be able to talk about formulas and proofs of PA within PA, we need
a so-called G odel numbering of LPA. That is an assignment of a numerical
code pq 2 N to each formula  2 LPA.As mentioned above, when working
in LPA, we often use m for m. Accordingly, whenever pq occurs within an
LPA-formula, what we mean is, of course, the LPA-term pq.
Making use of the G odel numbering, we can state the Diagonalization
lemma, which is crucial for dening arithmetical interpretations for LPCS.
Lemma 4.6 (Diagonalization) Let  (y;x0;:::;xn 1) be an LPA-formula.
There exists an LPA-formula (x0;:::;xn 1) such that
PA ` (x0;:::;xn 1) $  

p(x0;:::;xn 1)q; x0; :::; xn 1

and that is provably 1 if   is.
Last but not least we will use the notion of a proof predicate.
Denition 4.7 A proof predicate is a provably 1 formula Prf(x;y) with no
free occurrences of variables other than x and y such that for every LPA-
sentence  we have
PA `  if and only if
N  Prf(n;pq) for some natural number n.
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We will not formally establish the existence of proof predicates for PA. A
detailed formal construction of a proof predicate is presented, e.g., in [8]. For
the rest of this chapter, we simply assume that we are given a proof predicate,
which we denote by Proof(x;y).
5 Weak Arithmetical Interpretation
Denition 5.1 A weak arithmetical interpretation is a pair (;Prf) such that
(i)  maps atomic propositions of LJ to sentences of LPA;
(ii)  maps evidence terms of LJ to numerals of LPA;
(iii) Prf is a proof predicate;
(iv) for all evidence terms s and t we have:
N  Prf

s; p !  q

^ Prf

t; pq

! Prf

(s  t); p q

(4)
N  Prf

s; pq

_ Prf

t; pq

! Prf

(s + t); pq

(5)
N  Prf

s; pq

! Prf

(!s); pPrf
 
s;pq

q

. (6)
We extend the mapping  to all formulas of LJ by setting
(t:F) := Prf(t;pFq) ? := ? (F ! G) := F ! G .
If there is no need to explicitly mention the proof predicate Prf, we denote the
weak arithmetical interpretation (;Prf) by .
A weak arithmetical interpretation  is called a weak arithmetical CS-
interpretation if for each (c;A) 2 CS we have N  (c:A). An LJ-formula F
is weakly arithmetically CS-valid if PA ` F for all weak arithmetical CS-
interpretations .
Lemma 5.2 For any LJ-formula F and for any weak arithmetical interpreta-
tion (;Prf), the arithmetical formula F is a sentence and is provably 1.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 4.3. 2
Theorem 5.3 (Weak Arithmetical Soundness) Let CS be a constant
specication and F be an LJ-formula. Then we have
LPCS ` F implies F is weakly arithmetically CS-valid. (7)
Proof. Suppose  is a weak arithmetical CS-interpretation. We show (7) by
induction on the LPCS-derivation of F.
If F is a classical tautology, then so is F and we trivially have PA ` F.
If F is an instance of j, j+, or j4, then N  F follows from (4){(6). Since
F is provably 1 by Lemma 5.2, it follows by Theorem 4.5 that PA ` F.
If F is an axiom t:A ! A, then F = Prf(t;pAq) ! A. We distinguish
two cases, depending on whether the sentence Prf(t;pAq) is true or false in
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(i) N  Prf(t;pAq). By (3) we nd PA ` A and thus
PA ` Prf(t;pAq) ! A .
(ii) N 2 Prf(t;pAq). In this case Prf(t;pAq) is a false provably 1 sen-
tence, meaning that PA ` :Prf(t;pAq) by Theorem 4.5. Therefore,
again
PA ` Prf(t;pAq) ! A .
If F is the conclusion of an instance of axiom necessitation, then F has
the form c:A where (c;A) 2 CS. By assumption, we have N  (c:A). Since
(c:A) is a provably 1 sentence by Lemma 5.2, we nd by Theorem 4.5 that
PA ` (c:A).
Finally, if F is the conclusion of an instance of modus ponens, the claim
follows by the induction hypothesis and the fact that  distributes through
implication. 2
In the remainder of this section we show completeness of LPCS with respect
to weak arithmetical CS-interpretations where CS is a primitive recursive and
almost schematic constant specication. In order to obtain this result, we will
establish the following property:
Lemma 5.4 For each nitary CS-model Mn, there exists a weak arithmetical
CS-interpretation  such that for all LJ-formulas G
Mn  G implies N  G . (8)
Weak arithmetical completeness easily follows from Lemma 5.4.
Theorem 5.5 Let CS be a primitive recursive and almost schematic constant
specication. For any formula F of LJ we have
F is weakly arithmetically CS-valid implies LPCS ` F . (9)
Proof. Assume that LPCS 0 F. By Theorem 3.5, there exists a nitary CS-
model Mn with Mn 1 F. Thus Mn  :F. By Lemma 5.4, there is a
weak arithmetical CS-interpretation  such that N  (:F), i.e., N  :(F).
Therefore, N 2 F, which implies PA 0 F by soundness (2) of PA. Hence F is
not weakly arithmetically CS-valid. 2
The complicated part is to establish (8) from Lemma 5.2. For the rest of
this section, we assume that we are given
(i) a primitive recursive and almost schematic constant specication CS and
(ii) a nitary CS-model Mn.
Further, we assume that the G odel numbering of the union of LPA and LJ
is injective, that is
pE1q = pE2q if and only if E1  E2Kuznets and Studer 9
for any expressions E1;E2.
We rst have to decide what objects should serve as `proofs' in our arith-
metical interpretation. There will be two sources of `proofs':
(i) To begin with, all usual proofs will be `proofs.' This guarantees that the
direction from left to right in (3) is satised.
(ii) The second source of `proofs' are the evidence terms of LJ. Every term t
is a `proof' for all formulas B for which Mn  t:B.
To take care of the usual proofs, we make use of the usual primitive recursive
proof predicate Proof(x;y) for Peano Arithmetic. Without loss of generality we
assume that N 2 Proof(psq;k) for any evidence term s of LJ and any natural
number k.
In order to deal with the evidence terms, we denote by Prf(x;y) a formula
with no free variables other than x and y that will be chosen later based on its
desired properties that we are going to discuss now. For any such Prf(x;y), we
can dene an auxiliary translation y from LJ-formulas to LPA-sentences by:
py :=
(
ppq = ppq if Mn  p;
:(ppq = ppq) otherwise
for any atomic proposition p;
(t:F)y := Prf(ptq;pFyq) ;
?y := ? ;
(F ! G)y := Fy ! Gy .
Obviously, atomic propositions that hold in Mn are translated to provable
sentences and atomic propositions that do not hold in Mn are translated to
refutable sentences. (We need the translation y to be injective. Therefore,
simply putting
py :=
(
0 = 0 if Mn  p
0 = 1 otherwise
would not be sucient.)
If the formula Prf(x;y) contains some relation symbol R other than =,
i.e., some relation symbol not occurring in the y-translation outside of Prf,
then this translation is injective, in other words,
Fy  Gy implies F  G . (10)
We assume Fy  Gy and show (10) by induction on the structure of the LJ-
formula F.
(i) F is an atomic proposition. By the denition of y, G must also be an
atomic proposition and, by the injectivity of the G odel numbering, G must
be the same atomic proposition as F.
(ii) F is ?. By the denition of y, it is clear that G  ?.10 Weak Arithmetical Interpretationsfor the Logic of Proofs
(iii) F is a formula s:F1. Then G must be of the form t:G1. Indeed, suppose
towards a contradiction that G  G1 ! G2. Since (s:F1)y = Prf(k;n)
for suitable k and n, the sentence (s:F1)y  G
y
1 ! G
y
2 would contain
the symbol R, meaning that G
y
1 or G
y
2 would contain a subformula of the
form Prf(k1;n1). It would then remain to count the number of occurrence
of ! in Prf(x;y) to show that (s:F1)y  G
y
1 ! G
y
2 is impossible after all.
Therefore, G  t:G1. By the induction hypothesis and injectivity of the
G odel numbering we conclude s  t and F1  G1.
(iv) F is F1 ! F2. By the same argument as in (iii), we have G  G1 ! G2.
By the induction hypothesis, F1  G1 and F2  G2.
Thus, (10) is established. For any formula Prf(x;y) that yields an injective y,
it can be shown by using the standard techniques for G odel numbering that
binary functions dag(x;y) and undag(x;y) such that
dag(pBq;pPrf(x;y)q) = pByq and undag(pByq;pPrf(x;y)q) = pBq
(it does not matter much how these functions are dened on inputs that are
not G odel numbers of such formulas, e.g., they can be assumed to be constant
on all other inputs) are also primitive recursive and our language contains
corresponding function symbols dag and undag. Note that functions dag and
undag are supposed to take the G odel number of Prf(x;y) as a parameter.
Hence, unlike the translation y, these functions do not depend on Prf(x;y). This
means, in particular, that the way undag is dened does not depend on whether
y is injective or not. The above property, however, is only guaranteed for
injective y's. Note also that dag and undag do depend on the chosen model Mn.
By Theorem 3.7 the satisfaction relation for Mn is primitive recursive.
Therefore, there is a binary relation symbol Jus such that
N  Jus(n;k) if and only if
there is a term s and a formula F such that
n = psq; and k = pFq; and Mn  s:F .
As mentioned in Lemma 4.3, Jus(x;y) is a provably 1 formula. Using
Lemma 4.6, we now dene the desired formula Prf(x;y) to satisfy
PA ` Prf(x;y) $ Proof(x;y) _ Jus

x;undag
 
y;pPrf(x;y)q

. (11)
Moreover, since Proof(x;y) _ Jus
 
x;undag(y;z)

is clearly provably 1, so is
our Prf(x;y).
Thus, by soundness (2) of PA, for the universal closure of (11),
N  8x8y

Prf(x;y) $ Proof(x;y) _ Jus

x;undag
 
y;pPrf(x;y)q

. (12)
Further, (10) holds because the formula Prf(x;y) contains a relation sym-
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informally we have
Prf(x;y) if and only if
Proof(x;y) or
there is a term s and a formula F such that
x = psq; and y = pFyq; and Mn  s:F .
The key property of the translation y based on the chosen Prf is that LJ-
formulas that hold in Mn are translated to true LPA-sentences and formulas
that do not hold in Mn are translated to false LPA-sentences
Lemma 5.6 For each formula F of LJ we have:
(i) Mn  F implies N  Fy;
(ii) Mn 1 F implies N 2 Fy.
Proof. By simultaneous induction on the structure of F. We distinguish the
following cases:
(i) Let F be an atomic proposition. If Mn  F, then Fy is pFq = pFq,
which clearly is true. If Mn 1 F, then Fy is :(pFq = pFq), which
clearly is false.
(ii) If F = ?, then trivially we have Mn 1 ? and N 2 ?.
(iii) The case of F = G ! H is immediate by induction hypothesis.
(iv) Let F = s:G. If Mn  s:G, then N  Jus(psq;pGq). Given that
pGq = undag
 
pGyq;pPrf(x;y)q

(13)
we have by (12) that N  Prf
 
psq;pGyq

, i.e., N  (s:G)y.
If Mn 1 s:G, then N 2 Jus(psq;pGq). Moreover, N 2 Proof
 
psq;pGyq

since by assumption N 2 Proof(psq;k) for any k. Thus, by (12) and (13),
we have N 2 Prf
 
psq;pGyq

, i.e., N 2 (s:G)y.
2
Next, we show that Prf(x;y) is a proof predicate.
Lemma 5.7 For every LPA-sentence  we have
PA `  if and only if
N  Prf(n;pq) for some natural number n.
Proof. From left to right. Suppose PA ` . Then there is a natural number n
such that N  Proof(n;pq). By (12) we conclude N  Prf(n;pq).
From right to left. Suppose that N  Prf(n;pq). Then, by (12), ei-
ther N  Proof(n;pq), in which case PA `  follows immediately, or
n = psq for some evidence term s and some LJ-formula F such that pFq =
undag
 
pq;pPrf(x;y)q

and Mn  s:F. Therefore,   Fy and Mn  F.
By the previous lemma, N  Fy. Since Fy is a provably 1 sentence, we nd
PA ` Fy, i.e., PA ` 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Now we obtain a weak arithmetical CS-interpretation as follows.
Lemma 5.8 Let  be a mapping such that s := psq for each evidence term s
and P := Py for each atomic proposition P. Then the pair (;Prf) is a weak
arithmetical CS-interpretation. Moreover, we have
F = Fy (14)
for any LJ-formula F.
Proof. We start with showing (14) by induction on the structure of F. We
distinguish the following cases.
(i) If F is an atomic proposition, then F = Fy by denition.
(ii) If F = t:G, then t = ptq. By induction hypothesis, G = Gy. Thus,
(t:G) = Prf(t;pGq) = Prf(ptq;pGyq) = (t:G)y .
(iii) If F = ?, then ? = ?y by denition.
(iv) If F = G ! H, then G = Gy and H = Hy by induction hypothesis.
Thus, (G ! H) = G ! H = Gy ! Hy = (G ! H)y.
This nishes the proof of (14).
We show that (;Prf) is indeed a weak arithmetical CS-interpretation. The
mapping  maps atomic propositions of LJ to sentences of LPA and evidence
terms to numerals. Further, Prf is a proof predicate by the previous lemma.
It remains to establish (4){(6) from Denition 5.1. We only present a proof of
(4). The other proofs are similar.
Assume that N  Prf(s;p !  q) and N  Prf(t;pq), in other words,
N  Prf(psq;p !  q) and N  Prf(ptq;pq). By assumption N 2 Proof(prq;k)
for any evidence term r and any natural number k. Therefore, by (12) we nd
  Fy and    Gy for some LJ-formulas F and G such that
Mn  s:(F ! G) and Mn  t:F .
Hence, Mn  (s  t):G. By (12), we obtain N  Prf(ps  tq;pGyq), which is
N  Prf
 
(s  t);p q

.
It remains to show that the constant specication is respected. Let
(c;A) 2 CS. Then Mn  c:A. Thus, by Lemma 5.6, we have N  (c:A)y.
Hence, by (14), we have N  (c:A). 2
Now Lemma 5.4 follows easily. First, observe that by Lemma 5.8 the pair
(;Prf) is a weak arithmetical CS-interpretation. Suppose Mn  G. By
Lemma 5.6 we nd N  Gy, which is N  G by (14). This completes the proof
of weak arithmetical completeness.Kuznets and Studer 13
6 A Semantics of Proofs for Intuitionistic Logic
Denition 6.1 The mapping  : LJ ! L2 is dened by:
P := P for P 2 Prop ,
? := ? ,
(A ! B)
 := A ! B ,
(t:A)
 := 2A .
Lemma 6.2 For any constant specication CS and any formula F 2 LJ,
LPCS ` F implies S4 ` F .
Denition 6.3 [Realization] A realization is a mapping r: L2 ! LJ such that  
r(A)

= A.
The realization theorem [2,7,11] provides an embedding of S4 into LPCS.
Theorem 6.4 (Realization) Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate and
schematic constant specication. There exists a realization r such that for each
L2-formula F
S4 ` F implies LPCS ` r(F) .
Theorem 6.5 Let CS be a primitive recursive, axiomatically appropriate, and
schematic constant specication. There exists a realization r such that for each
L2-formula F
S4 ` F if and only if r(F) is weakly arithmetically CS-valid .
Proof. First we show the direction from left to right. By the realization the-
orem, there exists a realization r such that for each L2-formula F
S4 ` F implies LPCS ` r(F) .
Combining this with Theorem 5.3 we obtain for each L2-formula F
S4 ` F implies r(F) is weakly arithmetically CS-valid .
For the direction from right to left, let r be an arbitrary realization and
suppose that r(F) is weakly arithmetically CS-valid. By Theorem 5.5 we obtain
LPCS ` r(F). Hence by Lemma 6.2 we nd S4 ` F. 2
To obtain a provability semantics for intuitionistic logic IL, we combine the
previous result with the G odel translation from IL to S4. Let the translation t()
from IL to S4 be such that for each formula F of the language Lip of IL we have
IL ` F if and only if S4 ` t(F) .
Corollary 6.6 Let CS be a primitive recursive, axiomatically appropriate, and
schematic constant specication. There exists a realization r such that for each
Lip-formula F
IL ` F if and only if r(t(F)) is weakly arithmetically CS-valid .14 Weak Arithmetical Interpretationsfor the Logic of Proofs
7 Related Work
The construction of the proof predicate Prf(x;y) that we performed is essen-
tially taken from Artemov's original proof of arithmetical completeness for
LPCS, see [1,2,3]. Goris [12] used a similar construction to provide LPCS with a
semantics of proofs in Buss's system S1
2.
Our result relies on the fact that LPCS is not only decidable for nite
constant specications, but more generally for almost schematic ones. The
rst general decidability proof for LPCS with non-nite CS was done by Mkr-
tychev [18]. The notion of an almost schematic constant specication goes
back to Kuznets [16]. For recent presentations of various decidability results,
see [6,19,20].
G odel [10] suggested using a system with explicit proofs for the interpreta-
tion of S4 in a lecture already in 1938, but the transcript of the lecture only
appeared in 1995. Even before the publication of G odel's work, Artemov [1]
came up with the Logic of Proofs LPCS and established the realization theorem
as well as completeness with respect to arithmetical interpretations.
The rst systems for logics of proofs that feature formulas of the form t:F,
meaning t is a proof of F, appear in the work of Artemov and Straen [4,5]
who investigate arithmetical interpretations for these logics. However, these
ancestors of LPCS had no operations on proof terms and were too weak to
capture the 2-modality of S4 in full.
8 Conclusion
What is new in our work is the observation that the construction of the proof
predicate for the arithmetical interpretation can be made independent of the
constant specication if one considers weak arithmetical interpretations. Our
Corollary 6.6 provides a uniform arithmetical provability semantics for intu-
itionistic logic, a semantics that can be based on any of a wide class of constant
specications. This strengthens the previously known result by Artemov that
each intuitionistically valid formula has a constant specication that provides
a provability interpretation for this formula. In particular, for the rst time,
the Logic of Proofs LP itself, i.e., LPCS with the total constant specication CS
where each constant proves every axiom, provides a provability semantics for
intuitionistic logic.
It might be useful to point out exactly how Artemov's semantics was weak-
ened to obtain this result. The obvious change was that the niteness of proofs
property had to be dropped. According to Artemov's denition of the proof
predicate, each proof can only prove nitely many formulas, whereas in our
case the interpretation of a constant might need to prove innitely many ax-
ioms from a given axiom scheme. Secondly, while we dene how to interpret
arithmetically the , +, and !operations on proof terms, we do not extend the
corresponding arithmetical functions to the (G odel numbers of) proofs obtained
from the standard G odel proof predicate Proof.Kuznets and Studer 15
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